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Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?

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  • Fiorina, Morris P.

Abstract

Since World War II, divided government has become increasingly common in the American states. A significant component of the increase is the deterioration of Republican fortunes in state legislatures: after the 1990 and 1992 elections, for example, only five state legislatures were controlled by the Republicans. I shall examine the hypothesis that the professionalization of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to Democratic candidates and less attractive to Republican candidates, because full-time legislative service is incompatible with another career, and Democrats, on average, have less lucrative career opportunities than Republicans. Statistical analysis of post-World War II legislative elections outside the South is consistent with the argument: other things being equal, every ten-thousand-dollar increase in real biennial legislative compensation is associated with approximately a 1% increase in Democratic legislators.

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  • Fiorina, Morris P., 1994. "Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(2), pages 304-316, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:02:p:304-316_09
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    Cited by:

    1. King, David & Zeckhauser, Richard & Kim, Mark, 2004. "The Management Performance of the U.S. States," Working Paper Series rwp04-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Steven Rogers, 2016. "National Forces in State Legislative Elections," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 667(1), pages 207-225, September.
    3. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    4. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Outside Income and Moral Hazard: The Elusive Quest for Good Politicians," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-164, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    5. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1044, CESifo.
    6. Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez, 2012. "Divided we vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 517-536, June.
    7. Auerbach, Jan, 2022. "Productive Office and Political Elitism," MPRA Paper 114582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Jason Poulos, 2019. "Land lotteries, long-term wealth, and political selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 217-230, January.
    9. Thomas Carsey & William Berry, 2014. "What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 251-273, July.
    10. Becker, Johannes & Peichl, Andreas & Rincke, Johannes, 2008. "Politicians' Outside Earnings and Political Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 3902, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Johannes Becker & Andreas Peichl & Johannes Rincke, 2009. "Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 379-394, September.
    12. Mitchell Hoffman & Elizabeth Lyons, 2020. "A time to make laws and a time to fundraise? On the relation between salaries and time use for state politicians," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 1318-1358, August.
    13. Stephanie Owings & Rainald Borck, 2000. "Legislative Professionalism and Government Spending: Do Citizen Legislators Really Spend Less?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 210-225, May.
    14. Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Poutvaara, Panu, 2011. "Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 877-885, August.
    15. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2010. "Moonlighting politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 688-699, October.
    16. Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December.
    17. Joel Slemrod, 2005. "The Etiology of Tax Complexity: Evidence from U.S. State Income Tax Systems," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, May.
    18. Keith Krehbiel, 1996. "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 8(1), pages 7-40, January.
    19. John E. Owens & Scot Schraufnagel & Quan Li, 2016. "Assessing the Effects of Personal Characteristics and Context on U.S. House Speakers’ Leadership Styles, 1789-2006," SAGE Open, , vol. 6(2), pages 21582440166, April.
    20. James E. Alt & David D. Lassen, 2008. "Political And Judicial Checks On Corruption: Evidence From American State Governments," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 33-61, March.
    21. Eggers, Andy & Hainmueller, Jens, 2008. "MPs for Sale? Estimating Returns to Office in Post-War British Politics," MPRA Paper 7892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Gary W. Cox, 1999. "The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 147-169, April.
    23. Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Ballot access restrictions and candidate entry in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 59-71, March.

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