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Contract Length and the Return to Performance in Major League Baseball

Author

Listed:
  • Anthony C. Krautmann

    (DePaul University)

  • Margaret Oppenheimer

    (DePaul University)

Abstract

This article focuses on the relationship between contract length and compensation in Major League Baseball. Because the best players receive both the highest salaries and the longest contracts, wage regressions that omit length can lead to misleading inferences. Although contract duration is positively related with salaries, the authors find evidence of a negative relationship between contract length and a player’s return to performance. These results indicate some type of trade-off going on in the negotiation process that has not been identified in the previous literature on compensating wage differentials.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony C. Krautmann & Margaret Oppenheimer, 2002. "Contract Length and the Return to Performance in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 6-17, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:6-17
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David J. Berri & Rob Simmons, 2009. "Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(1), pages 23-43, February.
    2. Anthony C. Krautmann, 2013. "What Is Right With Scully Estimates of a Player’s Marginal Revenue Product," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(1), pages 97-105, February.
    3. Hsuan-Yu Lin & Chih-Hai Yang, 2016. "Uncertainty, specific investment, and contract duration: evidence from the MLB player market," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 1009-1028, May.
    4. David J. Berri & John Charles Bradbury, 2010. "Working in the Land of the Metricians," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(1), pages 29-47, February.
    5. Wiseman Frederick & Chatterjee Sangit, 2010. "Negotiating Salaries through Quantile Regression," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-15, January.
    6. Helmut Dietl & Tobias Duschl & Markus Lang, 2010. "Gehaltsobergrenzen und Luxussteuern: Erkenntnisse aus dem professionellen Mannschaftssport," Working Papers 0039, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    7. Dietl, Helmut M. & Duschl, Tobias & Lang, Markus, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 1-30, August.
    8. Holmes, Paul, 2011. "New evidence of salary discrimination in major league baseball," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 320-331, June.
    9. Reio Tanji, 2021. "Reference Dependence and Monetary Incentives: Evidence from Major League Baseball," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-23, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    10. Roberto Pedace & Curtis M. Hall, 2012. "Home Safe: No-Trade Clauses and Player Salaries in Major League Baseball," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 627-644, July.
    11. Anthony C. Krautmann, 2017. "Risk-Averse Team Owners and Players’ Salaries in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(1), pages 19-33, January.
    12. Terry, Ryan P. & McGee, Jeffrey E. & Kass, Malcolm J., 2018. "The not-so-free agent: Non-performance factors that contribute to free agent compensation premiums," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 189-201.
    13. Haupert, Michael & Murray, James, 2011. "Regime Switching and Wages in Major League Baseball under the Reserve Clause," MPRA Paper 29094, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Daniel R. Marburger, 2015. "How Are Athletic Directors Rewarded in the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(3), pages 254-267, April.
    15. Charles R. Link & Martin Yosifov, 2012. "Contract Length and Salaries Compensating Wage Differentials in Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 13(1), pages 3-19, February.
    16. Louis J. Pantuosco, 2011. "Does It Pay to Be Unethical? The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Mlb," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 56(2), pages 58-68, November.
    17. Heather O’Neill, 2013. "Do Major League Baseball Hitters Engage in Opportunistic Behavior?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(3), pages 215-232, August.
    18. Alexandre Olbrecht, 2007. "The economic return to college attendance for major league baseball players," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(13), pages 981-985.
    19. Jahn K. Hakes & Chad Turner, 2008. "Long-Term Contracts in Major League Baseball," Working Papers 0831, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.

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