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Does It Pay to Build Through the Draft in the National Basketball Association?

Author

Listed:
  • Akira Motomura
  • Kelsey V. Roberts
  • Daniel M. Leeds
  • Michael A. Leeds

Abstract

Many National Basketball Association executives and analysts claim that the best way to contend for a championship is to get very high draft picks, which may require losing many games. We test whether building through the draft promotes winning in several ways. We test whether having more and higher draft picks promotes improvement and whether giving draft picks more playing time helps teams win more. We find that the draft is not necessarily the best road to success. An excellent organization and General Manager better enable teams to succeed even without high draft picks.

Suggested Citation

  • Akira Motomura & Kelsey V. Roberts & Daniel M. Leeds & Michael A. Leeds, 2016. "Does It Pay to Build Through the Draft in the National Basketball Association?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(5), pages 501-516, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:17:y:2016:i:5:p:501-516
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002516641169
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph Price & Brian P. Soebbing & David Berri & Brad R. Humphreys, 2010. "Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(2), pages 117-135, April.
    2. Beck A. Taylor & Justin G. Trogdon, 2002. "Losing to Win: Tournament Incentives in the National Basketball Association," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 23-41, January.
    3. Peter A. Groothuis & James Richard Hill & Timothy J. Perri, 2007. "Early Entry in the NBA Draft," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(3), pages 223-243, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lenten, Liam J.A. & Smith, Aaron C.T. & Boys, Noel, 2018. "Evaluating an alternative draft pick allocation policy to reduce ‘tanking’ in the Australian Football League," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(1), pages 315-320.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila & Phillippe Solal, 2016. "An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings," Working Papers 2016-11, CRESE.
    3. Tobias Berger & Frank Daumann, 2021. "Anchoring bias in the evaluation of basketball players: A closer look at NBA draft decision‐making," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(5), pages 1248-1262, July.
    4. Brad R. Humphreys & Yulia Chikish & Peter von Allmen, 2024. "Should I Stay or Should I Go Pro? Early NFL Draft Entry by NCAA FBS Underclassmen," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 25(3), pages 346-368, April.

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