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Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Price

    (Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA)

  • Brian P. Soebbing

    (University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada)

  • David Berri

    (Southern Utah University, Cedar City, UT, USA)

  • Brad R. Humphreys

    (University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, brad.humphreys@ualberta.ca)

Abstract

Taylor and Trogdon found evidence of shirking under some, but not all, draft lottery systems used in three different National Basketball Association (NBA) seasons. The authors use data from all NBA games played from 1977 to 2007 and a fixed effects model to control for unobservable team and season heterogeneity to extend this research. The authors find that NBA teams were more likely to intentionally lose games at the end of the regular season during the seasons where the incentives to finish last were the largest.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Price & Brian P. Soebbing & David Berri & Brad R. Humphreys, 2010. "Tournament Incentives, League Policy, and NBA Team Performance Revisited," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(2), pages 117-135, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:11:y:2010:i:2:p:117-135
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002510363103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    tanking; NBA; tournament theory;
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