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Why Regimes Create Disorder

Author

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  • Federico Ferrara

    (Department of Political Science University of Kansas)

Abstract

Research on protest and repression has shown that state coercion may result in increased mobilization or effectively deter further challenges. The nature of dissident responses to repression is largely context-based. In Burma, as the military regime faced a massive uprising, although brutal coercion failed to quell the rebellion in August 1988, it succeeded in suppressing the democratic movement only a few weeks later. Such a difference is explained in terms of contextual transformations resulting from the government's strategic adaptation. Specifically, by suspending the supply of social order, the regime presented the population with Hobbes's dilemma. Forced to choose between dictatorship and anarchy, the Burmese people overwhelmingly defected from the democratic movement and reluctantly accepted the reestablishment of a highly oppressive order. This analytic narrative seeks to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between protest and repression and enrich the literature on strategic adaptation.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Ferrara, 2003. "Why Regimes Create Disorder," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(3), pages 302-325, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:47:y:2003:i:3:p:302-325
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002703252366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 471-487, June.
    3. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
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