IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v26y2014i2p236-262.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Marcum

    (Duke University, USA)

  • David Skarbek

    (King’s College London, UK)

Abstract

Given the substantial suffering of enslavement, why didn’t more slaves revolt during the Middle Passage of the Atlantic slave trade? We argue that the collective action problem was an important impediment to revolt. Revolts nearly always resulted in slave casualties, and crews tortured and killed conspirators. Overthrowing the crew benefited all of the slaves, so each slave had an incentive to free ride on others’ efforts to secure freedom. Using a rational choice framework, we argue that slaves could more effectively overcome the collective action problem when there were fewer slaves aboard, when there were fewer male slaves, and when the slaves were more homogenous. Data on slave voyages from 1750 to 1775 and archival and historical documents support these claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Marcum & David Skarbek, 2014. "Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 236-262, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:26:y:2014:i:2:p:236-262
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463113513001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463113513001
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463113513001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 75-98, June.
    2. Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis, 2012. "An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 497-515, June.
    3. Kuran, Timur, 1991. "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising That We Were Surprised?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 121-125, May.
    4. Mason, T. David, 1984. "Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1040-1056, December.
    5. Mark I. Lichbach, 1994. "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 8-39, January.
    6. Nathan Nunn, 2008. "The Long-term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 139-176.
    7. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 303-321.
    8. Habyarimana, James & Humphreys, Macartan & Posner, Daniel N. & Weinstein, Jeremy M., 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 709-725, November.
    9. Steckel, Richard H. & Jensen, Richard A., 1986. "New Evidence on the Causes of Slave and Crew Mortality in the Atlantic Slave Trade," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 57-77, March.
    10. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2008. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 379-388, Springer.
    11. Nathan Nunn & Leonard Wantchekon, 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3221-3252, December.
    12. Finkel, Steven E. & Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1989. "Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 885-903, September.
    13. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    14. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 129-154, March.
    15. J. Scott Long & Jeremy Freese, 2006. "Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables using Stata, 2nd Edition," Stata Press books, StataCorp LP, edition 2, number long2, March.
    16. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    17. Jack A. Goldstone, 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 139-166, January.
    18. Klosko, George & Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl Dieter, 1987. "Rebellious Collective Action Revisited," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 557-564, June.
    19. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 297-307, March.
    20. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    21. Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 471-487, June.
    22. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Niccolò G. Armandola & Malte Doehne & Katja Rost, 2024. "Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 36(2), pages 254-285, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 297-307, March.
    2. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, September.
    3. Mark I. Lichbach, 1994. "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 8-39, January.
    4. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013. "It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 251-271, June.
    5. Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2024. "Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 497-529, September.
    6. Louis Rouanet, 2024. "On the tendency of revolutions to devour their own children," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 603-626, September.
    7. Alessandro Moro, 2016. "Understanding the Dynamics of Violent Political Revolutions in an Agent-Based Framework," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(4), pages 1-17, April.
    8. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
    9. Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2016. "A Theory of Why the Ruthless Revolt," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 295-316, November.
    10. Nicoara Olga, 2018. "Cultural Leadership and Entrepreneurship As Antecedents of Estonia’s Singing Revolution and Post-Communist Success," TalTech Journal of European Studies, Sciendo, vol. 8(2), pages 65-91, September.
    11. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2021. "Group cooperation against a hegemon," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(1), pages 25-55, January.
    12. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    13. Sangnier, Marc & Zylberberg, Yanos, 2017. "Protests and trust in the state: Evidence from African countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 55-67.
    14. Sangnier, Marc & Zylberberg, Yanos, 2017. "Protests and trust in the state: Evidence from African countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 55-67.
    15. Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Gordon Tullock's theory of dictatorship and revolution," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    16. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, September.
    17. Thomas Apolte, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 158-178, June.
    18. Leeson, Peter T. & Nowrasteh, Alex, 2011. "Was privateering plunder efficient?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 303-317, August.
    19. Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
    20. Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2011. "Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 501-520, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:26:y:2014:i:2:p:236-262. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.