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Motivations for Choice

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  • DAVID L. ROUSSEAU

    (Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Realists assume that individuals are obsessed with relative gains and that cooperation is the exception rather than the norm in international relations. In contrast, liberal institutionalists assume that, in many situations, individuals are motivated by absolute gains. These critical assumptions are examined. Results show that the salience of relative gains varies with the beliefs of the individual, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation, and that individuals often employ alternative pure strategies (e.g., equity) or mixed strategies (e.g., relative gains in the domain of gains and absolute gains in the domain of losses). Decision strategies (e.g., relative gains, absolute gains, joint gains, equality, and altruism) are linked to the growing constructivist literature in international relations.

Suggested Citation

  • David L. Rousseau, 2002. "Motivations for Choice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 394-426, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:3:p:394-426
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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