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Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity

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  • Christensen, Thomas J.
  • Snyder, Jack

Abstract

Contemporary balance-of-power theory has become too parsimonious to yield determinate predictions about state alliance strategies in multipolarity. Kenneth Waltz's theory predicts only that multipolarity predisposes states to either of two opposite errors, which this article characterizes as chain-ganging and buck-passing. To predict which of these two policies will prevail, it is necessary to complicate Waltz's theory by adding a variable from Robert Jervis's theory of the security dilemma: the variable of whether offense or defense is perceived to have the advantage. At least under the checkerboard geographical conditions in Europe before World Wars I and II, perceived offensive advantage bred unconditional alliances, whereas perceived defensive advantage bred free riding on the balancing efforts of others.

Suggested Citation

  • Christensen, Thomas J. & Snyder, Jack, 1990. "Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 137-168, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:44:y:1990:i:02:p:137-168_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Zeev Maoz, 2009. "The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 223-240, January.
    2. Zeev Maoz & Ranan D. Kuperman & Lesley Terris & Ilan Talmud, 2006. "Structural Equivalence and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 664-689, October.
    3. Sanen Marshall, 2005. "A systemic perspective on regional integration after the end of the Cold War," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 347-360, October.
    4. Steven E. Miller, 1990. "Nordic Security in a Europe Without the United States," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 512(1), pages 46-57, November.
    5. John A. C. Conybeare, 1994. "Arms Versus Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 215-235, June.
    6. Zeev Maoz, 2012. "Preferential Attachment, Homophily, and the Structure of International Networks, 1816–2003," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 341-369, July.
    7. Ivan Savic & Zachary C. Shirkey, 2009. "Trust in the Balance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 483-507, October.
    8. Liam Campling & Elizabeth Havice, 2013. "Mainstreaming Environment and Development at the World Trade Organization? Fisheries Subsidies, the Politics of Rule-Making, and the Elusive ‘Triple Win’," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 45(4), pages 835-852, April.
    9. Stephen Biddle & Stephen Long, 2004. "Democracy and Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(4), pages 525-546, August.
    10. Muhammet A. Bas & Robert J. Schub, 2016. "How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(6), pages 1099-1128, September.
    11. Benjamin Fordham & Paul Poast, 2016. "All Alliances Are Multilateral," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(5), pages 840-865, August.
    12. David L. Rousseau, 2002. "Motivations for Choice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 394-426, June.
    13. Neil Narang & Rupal N. Mehta, 2019. "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 218-250, January.
    14. Matthew Fuhrmann, 2020. "When Do Leaders Free‐Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 416-431, April.
    15. John A. C. Conybeare, 1992. "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 53-85, March.
    16. Rajesh Rajagopalan & Varun Sahni, 2008. "India and the Great Powers," South Asian Survey, , vol. 15(1), pages 5-32, January.
    17. Lauren Sukin, 2020. "Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(6), pages 1011-1042, July.
    18. Mai'a K. Davis Cross & Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski & Kaija Schilde, 2017. "European Military Capabilities: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 37-53, January.
    19. Yoav Gortzak & Yoram Z. Haftel & Kevin Sweeney, 2005. "Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(1), pages 67-89, February.
    20. Ebert, Hannes & Flemes, Daniel & Strüver, Georg, 2012. "The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and Pakistan Deal with their Rising Neighbors," GIGA Working Papers 206, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    21. Weber, Shlomo & Weber, Yuval & Wiesmeth, Hans, 2019. "Hierarchy of Membership and Burden Sharing in a Military Alliance," CEPR Discussion Papers 13965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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