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The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations

Author

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  • Randall W. Stone

    (Department of Political Science University of Rochester)

Abstract

The author argues that the theory of moves, which has gained popularity in recent years as an alternative to game-theoretic analysis of strategic interaction, is fundamentally flawed. The theory's adherents argue that it makes theoretical progress by endogenizing the structure of games and introducing new ways of analyzing repeated interactions. The author analyzes the theory of moves from a game-theoretic perspective and challenges its theoretical claims. The author then reanalyzes several recent articles that have used the theory of moves, showing that its application to empirical cases is strained and that game theory can provide models that do a better job of fitting the stories the authors tell about them.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall W. Stone, 2001. "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 216-244, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:216-244
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045002004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    4. Powell, Robert, 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 717-735, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Cooperation: The Power Of A Single Word? Some Experimental Evidence On Wording And Gender Effects In A Game Of Chicken," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 43-64, January.
    2. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2008. "Cooperation in a Game of Chicken with Heterogeneous Agents: An Experimental Study," CIRED Working Papers hal-00395939, HAL.
    3. Arroyo, Santiago & Alegría, Alexander, 2009. "El conflicto colombo-venezolano y la construcción de escenarios desde la Teoría de Juegos [The Colombo-Venezuelan conflict and the construction of scenes from Theory of Games]," MPRA Paper 24396, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2009.

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