An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1005035407253
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- H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, 1998. "Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 830-860, December.
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Keywords
n-person games; Cooperative games; Central-union theory; Equal excess model; Myerson–Shapley solution; Kernel;All these keywords.
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