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Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from Highly Individualist and Collectivist Cultures

Author

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  • Craig D. Parks

    (Washington State University)

  • Anh D. Vu

    (Siena College)

Abstract

Existing studies of social dilemmas in other cultures report patterns of behavior that are very similar to that of American subjects. This has held even in cultures that are seemingly quite different from the United States in terms of their emphasis on the collective over the individual. We argue that, in fact, these cultures are not as different from the United States with regard to collectivity as they seem. In our study, we contrast the American—the most individualistic of all cultures—with the Vietnamese, an extremely collectivist culture. In the first study, American and South Vietnamese subjects played a number of trials of a public goods or resource dilemma game. The patterns of cooperation among the Americans were typical of most social dilemma studies. The Vietnamese, however, cooperated at an exceptionally high rate. In a second study, subjects were pitted against a variety of preprogrammed strategies that varied as to their toughness. The Americans responded in predictable ways, but the Vietnamese were again extremely cooperative, even when competing against an All-D (100% competition) strategy. The results suggest that cultural norms contribute somewhat to mixed-motive behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig D. Parks & Anh D. Vu, 1994. "Social Dilemma Behavior of Individuals from Highly Individualist and Collectivist Cultures," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(4), pages 708-718, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:4:p:708-718
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038004006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. Keith Murnighan & Alvin E. Roth, 1983. "Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(2), pages 279-300, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. João V. Ferreira & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Benoît Tarroux, 2017. "On the Roots of the Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights: Evidence from France and Japan," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2017-11, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    2. Natalia Ermasova & Lam D. Nguyen & Mary D. Bruce, 2017. "Leadership and Overload Stress Orientations of German and Russian Working Adults: Does Government Work Experience Make a Difference?," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 39-59, March.
    3. Lam D. Nguyen & Quan H. M. Tran, 2018. "Working Adults and Personal Business Ethics in South East Asia: a Comparative Study in Thailand and Vietnam," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 159-174, June.
    4. Nguyen, Quang & Villeval, Marie Claire & Xu, Hui, 2012. "Trust and Trustworthiness under the Prospect Theory: A Field Experiment in Vietnam," IZA Discussion Papers 6851, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Ahern, Kenneth R. & Daminelli, Daniele & Fracassi, Cesare, 2015. "Lost in translation? The effect of cultural values on mergers around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 165-189.

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