Modeling the Role of Conflict and Conciliation in Bargaining

So as to provide a more general framework for an analysis of those factors that can influence the outcome of bargaining under a situation of uncertainty, this article develops an adaptive-expectations multisized-concession paradigm of bargaining. The firmness with which bargainers hold to their positions is a function of the expected utility of the potential payoffs associated with alternative moves, and the size of alternative concession prospects is considered implicitly in relationship to the differential effect on subjective probability distributions. The construct permits the development of the role of bargaining as a communicative device, designed to transmit and receive information, create and dispel uncertainty. Bluff and notbluff are discussed as tactics of conflict and conciliation, within the context of a relationship between the manifest bargaining stance of bargainers and their actual commitment to their current demand. The “loss of face†factor involved in concession moves is explored, as well as the role of time and timing as bargaining tactics. Finally, quid pro quo is discussed as a tactic of conciliation, together with the constituents of what might be termed an optimum bargaining behavior.