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Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes

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  • David Dickinson
  • Lynn Hunnicutt

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  • David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2010. "Nonbinding recommendations: the relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 615-634, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:615-634
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-009-9156-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-159, February.
    2. David Dickinson, 2005. "Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(2), pages 145-166, June.
    3. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
    4. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
    5. Schotter, Andrew & Sopher, Barry, 2007. "Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 365-393, February.
    6. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
    7. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
    8. David Dickinson, 2003. "Expectations and Comparative Arbitration Institutions," Working Papers 2003-02, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-550, May.
    10. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1987. "Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 347-352, May.
    11. David Dickinson, 2009. "The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 69-101, January.
    12. Andrew Schotter, 2005. "Decision Making with Naïve Advice," Springer Books, in: Amnon Rapoport & Rami Zwick (ed.), Experimental Business Research, chapter 0, pages 223-248, Springer.
    13. Dickinson, David L., 2006. "The chilling effect of optimism: The case of final-offer arbitration," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-30, February.
    14. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "Reinterpreting Arbitration's Narcotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-33, October.
    15. David L. Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2005. "Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 401-416, April.
    16. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-173, April.
    17. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    18. David L. Dickinson, 2005. "The Effects of Beliefs versus Risk Preferences on Bargaining Outcomes," Working Papers 05-17, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    19. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-436, June.
    20. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    21. Maarten Janssen, 2001. "Rationalizing Focal Points," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 119-148, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Nedelescu, Daniel M., 2022. "The effect of a larger contract zone on agreement rates under arbitration," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    2. Daniel M. Nedelescu, 2019. "Alpha-Final Offer Arbitration: The Best Way to Avoid Negotiation Failure," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(6), pages 1109-1128, December.
    3. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-45.
    4. Pecorino, Paul & Solomon, Michael & Van Boening, Mark, 2021. "Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information: An experimental analysis of final offer arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 334-366.
    5. L. Monroy & V. Rubiales & A. M. Mármol, 2017. "The conservative Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for multiple scenario bargaining," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 251(1), pages 285-299, April.

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