Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
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- Sloof, Randolph, 2008. "Price-setting power vs. private information: An experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 469-486, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete Contracts; Hold-Up; Fairness; Bargaining under Incomplete Information; Signalling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2005-10-29 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-10-29 (Microeconomics)
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