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A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets

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  • H. Andrew Michener

    (University of Wisconsin)

  • Melvin M. Sakurai

    (University of Wisconsin)

  • Kenneth Yuen

    (University of Wisconsin)

  • Thomas J. Kasen

    (University of Wisconsin)

Abstract

Two game theoretic solution theories, the M 1 (i) bargaining set and the M 1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M 1 (im) is significantly and consistently superior to M 1 (i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p

Suggested Citation

  • H. Andrew Michener & Melvin M. Sakurai & Kenneth Yuen & Thomas J. Kasen, 1979. "A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 102-119, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:23:y:1979:i:1:p:102-119
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277902300106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Maschler, 1963. "The Power of a Coalition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 8-29, October.
    2. Reinhard Selten & Klaus G. Schuster, 1968. "Psychological Variables and Coalition-Forming Behaviour," International Economic Association Series, in: Karl Borch & Jan Mossin (ed.), Risk and Uncertainty, chapter 0, pages 221-246, Palgrave Macmillan.
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