A Behavioral Model of Coalition Formation
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DOI: 10.1177/002200277602000401
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References listed on IDEAS
- Riker, William H. & Zavoina, William James, 1970. "Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three Person Game," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 48-60, March.
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- Colantoni, Claude S. & Levesque, Terrence J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1975. "Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 141-154, March.
- Riker, William H., 1967. "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 642-656, September.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017.
"Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
- Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2017. "Alliances Electorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," TSE Working Papers 17-789, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2017.
- de Oliveira Amâncio Jorge & Onuki Janina, 2010. "India, Brazil and South Africa: Collective Action, Divergent Positions," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-25, November.
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