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Bargaining in a Three-Person Game

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  • Riker, William H.

Abstract

Games are paradigms of many political events, especially those that involve partial or complete conflicts of interest among the participants. As paradigms, they display in relatively simple social interaction the same fundamental forces found in the more complex interactions of the grander political events whose structure they share. This is the feature of games that makes them attractive vehicles for both theorizing and experimentation in the social sciences. The scientific expectation is that, by studying the quasi-political interaction of games—where the variations among institutional, psychological, and ideological components of behavior are minimized—one will be able to understand more profoundly the basic political activities of bargaining, forming coalitions, and choosing strategies. This more profound understanding is a consequence of obtaining answers to the following questions:(1) What is the mathematical solution, that is, what amount of utility can players be expected to obtain, when it is assumed that players are rational and wish to maximize utility?(2) What is the strategy (or method of playing) that will ensure players of achieving the solution?An answer to the first question indicates what may be anticipated as the outcome of political events. If we know it, then, if also we can assume players are rational maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future with some confidence. An answer to the second question (about strategies) permits political engineers to give advice to politicians about how to behave successfully.

Suggested Citation

  • Riker, William H., 1967. "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 642-656, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:61:y:1967:i:03:p:642-656_20
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Janet E. Berl & Richard D. McKelvey & Peter C. Ordeshook & Mark D. Winer, 1976. "An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(3), pages 453-479, September.
    2. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    3. Bernhardt Lieberman, 1971. "Not an artifact," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 15(1), pages 113-120, March.
    4. Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429.
    5. Mushin Lee & Howard Rosenthal, 1976. "A Behavioral Model of Coalition Formation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(4), pages 563-588, December.
    6. T. Edward Westen & James J. Buckley, 1974. "Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(2), pages 198-236, June.
    7. Byron M. Roth, 1979. "Competing Norms of Distribution in Coalition Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(3), pages 513-537, September.
    8. William P. Bottom & James Holloway & Scott McClurg & Gary J. Miller, 2000. "Negotiating a Coalition," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(2), pages 147-169, April.
    9. James J. Buckley & T. Edward Westen, 1976. "Bargaining Set Theory and Majority Rule," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 20(3), pages 481-496, September.

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