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From Civic Organization to NGOs in Germany: An Interest Group Analysis

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  • Bernhard Seliger

Abstract

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) appear to be a new and increasingly important element in political decision-making throughout the world and have been accordingly analyzed as something new and unique. However, at a second glance a long tradition of non-governmental organized activity can be observed in many countries, including European countries like Germany. Also, the analysis of NGO shows that they often differ only in minor aspects from traditional interest groups and therefore make it possible to apply traditional interest group analysis. In this paper, the activity of NGOs is analysed under these two hypotheses, namely that non-governmental activity is a voluntary institution which has evolved throughout history and that the analysis of NGOs' contribution can use the analytical tool of interest group analysis developed for political economy. The paper gives a short historical overview of NGO activities in Germany. Then it compares a sociological and a political economy approach for the analysis of NGOs. Afterwards, various channels of influence open to NGOs in Germany's particular political and economic setting are discussed, followed by some conclusions for research and policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard Seliger, 2003. "From Civic Organization to NGOs in Germany: An Interest Group Analysis," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 53-68, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:53-68
    DOI: 10.1177/223386590300600104
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