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Manipulative Features of Planning Styles

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  • Tore Sager

    (Department of Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 7491 Trondheim, Norway)

Abstract

This paper identifies features of well-known planning modes affecting the likelihood of manipulation. Results from social choice theory and the economic theory of organisation help to explain why certain combinations of planning styles and organisational characteristics stimulate or hamper manipulation. Although the planning process can be rigged in many ways, false revelation of preferences and strategic agenda formation are primarily studied here. When each decisionmaker can rank the alternatives any way he or she wants, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem states that manipulation-free procedures for making recommendations do not exist unless cyclical decisions or high concentrations of power are accepted. In general, a low probability of cyclical recommendations and a strong organisational bias favouring certain interests and alternatives reduce the likelihood of successful manipulation. It is argued that these conditions are present particularly in advocacy planning and—perhaps counterintuitively—to some extent in disjointed incrementalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Tore Sager, 2001. "Manipulative Features of Planning Styles," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 33(5), pages 765-781, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:33:y:2001:i:5:p:765-781
    DOI: 10.1068/a3320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    2. Tore Sager, 2001. "Planning Style and Agency Properties," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 33(3), pages 509-532, March.
    3. Sven Hansson, 1996. "Social choice with procedural preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(2), pages 215-230, April.
    4. John Chamberlin, 1986. "Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 295-313, January.
    5. Ordeshook, Peter C. & Schwartz, Thomas, 1987. "Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 179-199, March.
    6. Thomas Hammond & Jeffrey Horn, 1985. "‘Putting one over on the boss’: The political economy of strategic behavior in organizations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, January.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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