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The Role of Non-CO2 GHGs in Climate Policy: Analysis Using the MIT IGSM

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  • John Reilly
  • Marcus Sarofim
  • Sergey Paltsev
  • Ronald Prinn

Abstract

First steps toward a broad climate agreement, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have focused on less than global geographic coverage. We consider instead a policy that is less comprehensive in term of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including only the non-CO2 GHGs, but is geographically comprehensive. Abating non-CO2 GHGs may be seen as less of a threat to economic development and therefore it may be possible to involve developing countries in such a policy even though they have resisted limits on CO2 emissions. The policy we consider involves a GHG price of about $15 per ton carbon-equivalent (tce) levied only on the non-CO2 GHGs and held at that level through the century. We estimate that such a policy would reduce the global mean surface temperature in 2100 by about 0.55° C; if only methane is covered that alone would achieve a reduction of 0.3° to 0.4° C. We estimate the Kyoto Protocol in its current form would achieve a 0.25° C reduction in 2100 if Parties to it maintained it as is through the century. Furthermore, we estimate the costs of the non-CO2 policies to be a small fraction of the Kyoto policy. Whether as a next step to expand the Kyoto Protocol, or as a separate initiative running parallel to it, the world could well make substantial progress on limiting climate change by pursuing an agreement to abate the low cost non-CO2 GHGs. The results suggest that it would be useful to proceed on global abatement of non-CO2 GHGs so that lack of progress on negotiations to limit CO2 does not allow these abatement opportunities to slip away.

Suggested Citation

  • John Reilly & Marcus Sarofim & Sergey Paltsev & Ronald Prinn, 2006. "The Role of Non-CO2 GHGs in Climate Policy: Analysis Using the MIT IGSM," The Energy Journal, , vol. 27(3_suppl), pages 503-520, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:27:y:2006:i:3_suppl:p:503-520
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-VolSI2006-NoSI3-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mustafa Babiker & John Reilly & Laurent Viguier, 2004. "Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?," The Energy Journal, , vol. 25(2), pages 33-56, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tol, Richard S.J., 2009. "Intra- and extra-union flexibility in meeting the European Union's emission reduction targets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4329-4336, November.
    2. Tol, Richard S.J., 2013. "Targets for global climate policy: An overview," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 911-928.
    3. Nebojsa Nakicenovic & Peter Kolp & Keywan Riahi & Mikiko Kainuma & Tatsuya Hanaoka, 2006. "Assessment of emissions scenarios revisited," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(3), pages 137-173, September.
    4. Tol, Richard S.J., 2012. "A cost–benefit analysis of the EU 20/20/2020 package," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 288-295.
    5. S. Paltsev & J. Reilly & H. Jacoby & A. Gurgel & G. Metcalf & A. Sokolov & J. Holak, 2007. "Assessment of U.S. Cap-and-Trade Proposals," Working Papers 0705, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    6. Suzi Kerr & Adam Millard-Ball, 2012. "Cooperation To Reduce Developing Country Emissions," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(04), pages 1-30.
    7. Gilbert E. Metcalf & Sergey Paltsev & John Reilly & Henry Jacoby & Jennifer F. Holak, 2008. "Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals," NBER Working Papers 13980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kuik, Onno & Brander, Luke & Tol, Richard S.J., 2009. "Marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions: A meta-analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1395-1403, April.
    9. Halkos, George, 2010. "Construction of abatement cost curves: The case of F-gases," MPRA Paper 26532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Nebojsa Nakicenovic & Peter Kolp & Keywan Riahi & Mikiko Kainuma & Tatsuya Hanaoka, 2006. "Assessment of emissions scenarios revisited," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(3), pages 137-173, September.
    11. Babiker, Mustafa & Gurgel, Angelo & Paltsev, Sergey & Reilly, John, 2009. "Forward-looking versus recursive-dynamic modeling in climate policy analysis: A comparison," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1341-1354, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-CO2 greenhouse gases; Climate policy; MIT IGSM model; Economic costs of mitigation policy;
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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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