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Market Power, International CO2, Taxation and Oil Wealth

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  • Elin Berg
  • Snorre Kvemdokk
  • Knut Einar Rosendahl

Abstract

We present an intertemporal equilibrium model for fossil fuels, and study the effects on oil prices, extraction paths and oil wealth of an international carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption Our conclusion is that a carbon tax will hurt OPEC more than other producers, as the cartel is induced by its market power to restrain production in order to maintain the oil price. Thus, the effects on the oil wealth of the competitive fringe are minor, while OPECs wealth is considerably reduced. We also show by applying a competitive model that this result is due to market structure, and not to differences in the resource base.

Suggested Citation

  • Elin Berg & Snorre Kvemdokk & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 1997. "Market Power, International CO2, Taxation and Oil Wealth," The Energy Journal, , vol. 18(4), pages 33-71, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:33-71
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol18-No4-2
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    1. Franz Wirl, 1995. "The exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 333-352, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aune, Finn Roar & Grimsrud, Kristine & Lindholt, Lars & Rosendahl, Knut Einar & Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid, 2017. "Oil consumption subsidy removal in OPEC and other Non-OECD countries: Oil market impacts and welfare effects," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 395-409.
    2. Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2000. "Stabilization of CO2 concentrations: mitigation scenarios using the Petro model," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(2), pages 195-224, June.
    3. Alonso-Alvarez, Irma & Di Nino, Virginia & Venditti, Fabrizio, 2022. "Strategic interactions and price dynamics in the global oil market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Lars Lindholt, 2005. "Beyond Kyoto: backstop technologies and endogenous prices on CO2 permits and fossil fuels," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(17), pages 2019-2036.
    5. Strand, Jon, 2013. "Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 202-218.
    6. Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.
    7. Finn Roar Aune & Ann Christin Bøeng & Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2017. "Fuel Efficiency Improvements: Feedback Mechanisms and Distributional Effects in the Oil Market," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(1), pages 15-45, September.
    8. Comincioli, Nicola & Hagspiel, Verena & Kort, Peter M. & Menoncin, Francesco & Miniaci, Raffaele & Vergalli, Sergio, 2021. "Mothballing in a Duopoly: Evidence from a (Shale) Oil Market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    9. Gjerde, Jon & Grepperud, Sverre & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1999. "Optimal climate policy under the possibility of a catastrophe," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 289-317, August.
    10. Finn Roar Aune & Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2005. "Profitability of different instruments in international climate policies," Discussion Papers 403, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    11. Berg, Elin & Kverndokk, Snorre & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2002. "Oil Exploration under Climate Treaties," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 493-516, November.
    12. Kverndokk,S. & Rosendahl,E., 2000. "CO2 mitigation costs and ancillary benefits in the Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland : a survey," Memorandum 34/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    13. Daniel Nachtigall, 2017. "Prices versus Quantities: The Impact of Fracking on the Choice of Climate Policy Instruments in the Presence of OPEC," Working Papers 2017001, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    14. Pål Boug & Ådne Cappelen, 2022. "Did OPEC change its behaviour after the November 2014 meeting?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(5), pages 2285-2305, May.
    15. Nachtigall, Daniel, 2017. "Prices versus quantities: The impact of fracking on the choice of climate policy instruments in the presence of OPEC," Discussion Papers 2017/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    16. Lars Lindholt, 1999. "Beyond Kyoto: CO2 permit prices and the markets for fossil fuels," Discussion Papers 258, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    17. Finn Roar Aune & Solveig Glomsrød & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2005. "Are high oil prices profitable for OPEC in the long run?," Discussion Papers 416, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    18. Steffen Kallbekken & Jon Hovi, 2007. "The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-15, March.
    19. Waisman, Henri & Rozenberg, Julie & Hourcade, Jean Charles, 2013. "Monetary compensations in climate policy through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment: The case of oil-exporting countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 951-961.
    20. Jon Strand, 2010. "Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade in Climate Policy when only some Fuel Importers Abate," CESifo Working Paper Series 3233, CESifo.
    21. Wie, Jiegen & Wennlock, Magnus & Johansson, Daniel J.A. & Sterner, Thomas, 2011. "The Fossil Endgame: Strategic Oil Price Discrimination and Carbon Taxation," RFF Working Paper Series dp-11-26, Resources for the Future.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Carbon taxes; Exhaustible resources; Oil wealth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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