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Who Is Powerful?

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  • Jonathan B. Slapin

    (University of California, Los Angeles, USA)

Abstract

Previous studies have proposed competing theories to explain European intergovernmental conference (IGC) outcomes, but they fail to test these theories against one another. I examine the literature on IGC bargaining and derive several testable hypotheses. Using data on member state preferences at the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, I first examine which member states favor integration and which are most skeptical of integration. I also determine which member states face the highest domestic ratification constraints. I then test the competing hypotheses found in the literature by calculating the bargaining strength of member states. I find that large member states have no more bargaining strength than the average member state; instead, domestic ratification constraints seem to confer power. States preferring less integration appear to outperform states desiring more integration. Supranational actors, as expected, have little power.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan B. Slapin, 2006. "Who Is Powerful?," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(1), pages 51-76, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:51-76
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506060912
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mo, Jongryn, 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 914-924, December.
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    7. repec:bla:scandj:v:97:y:1995:i:2:p:345-56 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas König & Daniel Finke, 2007. "Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-176, June.

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