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Using Mass Survey Data to Infer Political Positions

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Hug

    (IPZ, University of Zurich, Switzerland, hug@pwi.unizh.ch)

  • Tobias Schulz

    (IPZ, University of Zurich, Switzerland, schulz@pwi.unizh.ch)

Abstract

An increasing number of member countries of the European Union (EU) is heading for ratification through referendum of the yet to be adopted constitution for Europe. Such popular votes will add an additional ratification constraint and empirical models will require information on the positions of the voters on various issues related to the new treaty. This information can come only from mass surveys. In this paper we discuss the ways in which data from mass surveys may be used to infer the policy positions of voters on the most salient aspects of the constitutional treaty. We also propose a way in which these policy positions may be connected with information on the policy positions of the member states’ governments. Combining this information, which is almost imperative for systematic tests of two-level games, allows us to demonstrate that certain referendums are likely to lead to ‘involuntary defections’. In addition, our analysis shows that the prospect of referendums has already led to changes in the draft constitution.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2005. "Using Mass Survey Data to Infer Political Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 339-352, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:6:y:2005:i:3:p:339-352
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116505054836
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mo, Jongryn, 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 914-924, December.
    2. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information And Domestic Politics: The Role Of Domestic Groups," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 145-189, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.

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