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Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament

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  • Amie Kreppel

    (Department of Political Science, University of Florida, USA)

Abstract

This research investigates the frequent creation of voting coalitions between the Socialist (PSE) and largely Christian Democratic (PPE) party groups within the European Parliament. The tendency of the PPE and PSE to form a `grand coalition' is frequently understood to imply that there is no significant role for ideology in the EP. Two common explanations of the creation of the `grand coalition' are tested demonstrating their inability to adequately explain actual coalition trends. I then offer some simple spatial models as a means of predicting when we should expect to see the grand coalition form. I then analyze 200 votes to test for the existence of each of the theoretical models and discuss the present and future role of ideology within the EP.

Suggested Citation

  • Amie Kreppel, 2000. "Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(3), pages 340-362, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:340-362
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    2. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    3. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Caroli & Nicola Genga & Alvaro Imbernon & Iulian Stanescu, 2014. "Towards a new European polity? Social democrats and the 2014 ep elections," Journal of Community Positive Practices, Catalactica NGO, issue 2, pages 81-114.

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