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Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation

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  • Lukas Obholzer
  • Steffen Hurka
  • Michael Kaeding

Abstract

The European Parliament organizes its legislative activities along two chains of delegation to the rapporteurs – one institutional, one partisan. We analyze discretion and agency loss along these chains of delegation from the perspective of party group coordinators who select the rapporteur on behalf of the party group. Do coordinators minimize agency loss towards their national party, their European party group, the committee median or the plenary median when allocating reports? Data from the 2009–2014 legislative term demonstrate that coordinators tend to select rapporteurs who are close to their own national party’s ideal point on the integration dimension. This has important implications for intra-parliamentary and intra-party delegation, party group cohesion and broader policy-making in the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Lukas Obholzer & Steffen Hurka & Michael Kaeding, 2019. "Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 239-260, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:2:p:239-260
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116519827383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Steffen Hurka & Maximilian Haag & Constantin Kaplaner, 2023. "Proposal complexity and report allocation in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 307-326, June.
    2. Robin Schädler & Gijs Jan Brandsma, 2021. "Some Are more Equal than Others: Report Allocation to Members of the European Parliament from New Member States," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 697-720, May.
    3. Frank M Häge & Nils Ringe, 2020. "Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 706-727, December.
    4. Fang-Yi Chiou & Silje SL Hermansen & Bjørn Høyland, 2020. "Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 233-254, June.

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