IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ecdequ/v24y2010i4p311-324.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Distribution of Federal Economic Development Grant Funds: A Consideration of Need and the Urban/Rural Divide

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy L. Hall

    (The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA, Jeremy.Hall@utdallas.edu)

Abstract

This article seeks to determine the effect of rurality and need on per capita federal grant receipts in local areas over time, controlling for local and regional government capacities. In other words, are rural places treated differently than urban places in federal grant distributions? Kentucky is used as the case state, with 120 county areas considered over an 11-year period from 1993 to 2003. Factor analysis is used to explore the underlying capacity constructs, and a pooled cross-sectional analysis reveals differential effects of grant receipts per person according to a county’s position on the rural—urban continuum (aka Beale code) and need-based indicators. Whereas rurality significantly increases grant funding per capita, need has the opposite effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy L. Hall, 2010. "The Distribution of Federal Economic Development Grant Funds: A Consideration of Need and the Urban/Rural Divide," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(4), pages 311-324, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:24:y:2010:i:4:p:311-324
    DOI: 10.1177/0891242410366562
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0891242410366562
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0891242410366562?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rich, Michael J., 1989. "Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 193-213, March.
    2. Jeffrey A. Finkle, 1999. "The Case Against Targeting Might Have Been More...Targeted," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 13(4), pages 361-364, November.
    3. Chubb, John E., 1985. "The Political Economy of Federalism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 994-1015, December.
    4. Frances E. Lee, 2003. "Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 714-728, October.
    5. Quigley, John M & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1986. "Budget Reform and the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 132-137, May.
    6. Chester J. Straub Jr. & Kelly Robinson, 2000. "Response to Thornburgh and Hill: The Federal Role in Economic Development," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 14(3), pages 257-266, August.
    7. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    8. Cynthia L. Rogers & Jill L. Tao, 2004. "Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Targeted Economic Development Programs: Lessons from Florida," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 18(3), pages 269-285, August.
    9. Leatherman, John C. & Deller, Steven C., 2001. "Building Local Government Capacity: The Toolbox for Outreach Educators," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 31(1), pages 1-20.
    10. Andrew F. Haughwout, 1999. "New Estimates of the Impact of EDA Public Works Program Investments on County Labor Markets," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 13(4), pages 371-382, November.
    11. Jeremy L. Hall, 2007. "Developing Historical 50-State Indices of Innovation Capacity and Commercialization Capacity," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 21(2), pages 107-123, May.
    12. Putnam, Robert D. & Leonardi, Robert & Nanetti, Raffaella Y. & Pavoncello, Franco, 1983. "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 55-74, March.
    13. Terry F. Buss, 1999. "To Target or Not to Target, That’s the Question: A Response to Wiewel and Finkle," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 13(4), pages 365-370, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yaniv Reingewertz & Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2020. "Distributive spending and presidential partisan politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 65-85, October.
    2. A. Abigail Payne, 2003. "The Effects of Congressional Appropriation Committee Membership on the Distribution of Federal Research Funding to Universities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 325-345, April.
    3. Royce Carroll & Henry A. Kim, 2010. "Party Government and the “Cohesive Power of Public Plunder”," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 34-44, January.
    4. Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah, 2009. "Decentralization, Subnational Governments' Behaviour and Macroeconomic Instability: The Case of Malaysia," MPRA Paper 19071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Hymel, Kent, 2019. "If you build it, they will drive: Measuring induced demand for vehicle travel in urban areas," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 57-66.
    6. Riemer P. Faber & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 60-95, February.
    7. Geiguen Shin & Jeremy L. Hall, 2018. "Exploring the Influence of Federal Welfare Expenditures on State-Level New Economy Development Performance: Drawing From the Diffusion of Innovation Theory," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 32(3), pages 242-256, August.
    8. Jeffrey Lazarus, 2010. "Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 338-353, April.
    9. Stratmann, Thomas, 2013. "The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 341-355.
    10. Stuart Kasdin & Luona Lin, 2015. "Strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 309-329, September.
    11. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2017. "Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems: evidence from Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 75-98, April.
    12. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2009. "Political Dynasties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142.
    13. Lundin, Magnus & Gottfries, Nils & Lindström, Tomas, 2004. "Price and Investment Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis of Plant Level Data," Working Paper Series 2004:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    14. Pierre Andre & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2010. "Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," Working Papers halshs-00962698, HAL.
    15. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    16. Arulampalam, Wiji & Dasgupta, Sugato & Dhillon, Amrita & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 103-119, January.
    17. Gobillon, Laurent & Magnac, Thierry & Selod, Harris, 2012. "Do unemployed workers benefit from enterprise zones? The French experience," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 881-892.
    18. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:169:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Brian Knight, 2008. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and The Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence From The Us Congress," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1785-1803, October.
    20. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
    21. Leonardo Bonilla-Mejía & Iván Higuera-Mendieta, 2017. "Political Alignment in the Time of Weak Parties: Electoral Advantages and Subnational Transfers in Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional y Urbana 15746, Banco de la República, Economía Regional.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:24:y:2010:i:4:p:311-324. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.