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Distributive spending and presidential partisan politics

Author

Listed:
  • Yaniv Reingewertz

    (University of Haifa)

  • Thushyanthan Baskaran

    (University of Siegen)

Abstract

Do Republican and Democratic presidents vary in their geographic allocations of federal spending? Recent scholarship suggests that US presidents provide more federal outlays to districts represented by their co-partisans, but leave the issue of partisan affiliation unanswered. We explore that question using an updated database that covers federal spending programs over the 1984–2014 period. We show that the alignment effect found in previous studies cannot be observed for Republican presidents. We argue that Republican presidents may not use pork as much as Democratic presidents because their core constituency is fiscally conservative. One implication of the results reported herein is that the electoral benefits of distributive politics depend on the fiscal preferences of the electorate.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaniv Reingewertz & Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2020. "Distributive spending and presidential partisan politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 65-85, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:185:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00740-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00740-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Luisa Schneider & Daniela Wech & Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Political alignment and project funding," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(6), pages 1561-1589, December.
    4. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2021. "Appointed public officials and local favoritism: Evidence from the German states," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    5. Alexander Maas & Liang Lu, 2021. "Elections have Consequences: Partisan Politics may be Literally Killing Us," Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 45-56, January.

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