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Precrisis military hostility and escalation in international crises

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  • Luba Levin-Banchik

Abstract

Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

Suggested Citation

  • Luba Levin-Banchik, 2021. "Precrisis military hostility and escalation in international crises," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(1), pages 63-86, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:38:y:2021:i:1:p:63-86
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894220906376
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