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What Do Regulated Firms Maximize?

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  • Philip Fanara Jr.
  • David M. Sweet

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  • Philip Fanara Jr. & David M. Sweet, 1984. "What Do Regulated Firms Maximize?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 28(1), pages 44-48, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:28:y:1984:i:1:p:44-48
    DOI: 10.1177/056943458402800107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1968. "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lewe68-1.
    2. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1968. "Introduction, "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations"," NBER Chapters, in: Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations, pages 1-9, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Malone, 1970. "Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 1(1), pages 129-142, Spring.
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