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Les communs comme infrastructure institutionnelle de l’économie marchande

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  • Allaire, Gilles

Abstract

Ce texte s’intéresse aux systèmes de ressources communes immatérielles constituant l’environnement culturel des activités productives, marchandes et administratives. Il entend suggérer que ces communs forment une infrastructure des économies marchandes modernes. S’appuyant sur les travaux d’Elinor Ostrom, il met en avant pour cela trois thèses principales. Non seulement les différences dans l’origine ou le fonctionnement des communs matériels et immatériels ne mettent pas en cause leur nature similaire, puisqu’il s’agit dans les deux cas d’arrangements institutionnels régissant l’accès à et le management de ces ressources selon des visées communes, ce qui ne veut pas dire sans conflits ; mais de plus les systèmes de ressources communes associent couramment ces deux types de communs. Les communs ne sont pas une survivance du passé, au contraire de vastes et complexes systèmes de ressources communes sont construits avec le développement des systèmes de marchés. Les interrelations entre systèmes de ressources communes et entre ceux-ci, marchés et systèmes juridiques, conduisent à des dynamiques incertaines de ces systèmes, dont la valeur est alors intangible, dépendante de conditions futures. Le maintien, développement ou régression des communs dépendent de la façon dont ils sont exploités. Leur devenir dépend également des dynamiques technologiques, sociales et des marchés qui se rapportent à l’activité des utilisateurs. Cette perspective, qui met en avant les relations et interdépendances entre communs et marchés, apportent des outils d’analyse de la diversité et de la complexité institutionnelle des économies.

Suggested Citation

  • Allaire, Gilles, 2013. "Les communs comme infrastructure institutionnelle de l’économie marchande," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2014:10546
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    4. Chanteau, Jean-Pierre & Labrousse, Agnès, 2013. "L’institutionnalisme méthodologique d’Elinor Ostrom : quelques enjeux et controverses," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
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    1. Chanteau, Jean-Pierre & Labrousse, Agnès, 2013. "L’institutionnalisme méthodologique d’Elinor Ostrom : quelques enjeux et controverses," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    2. Noé Guiraud & Juliette Rouchier, 2016. "La Visibilité comme Ressource dans la Gouvernance des Circuits Courts : Une Approche Institutionnaliste de l'Évaluation pour l'Observatoire des Circuits Courts de PACA," AMSE Working Papers 1631, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    3. François Lataste & Aurélie Trouvé & Marielle Berriet-Solliec & Janet Dwyer, 2015. "La notion de « biens publics » au secours de la Politique Agricole Commune ?," Post-Print hal-01151920, HAL.
    4. Yvan Renou & Thomas Bolognesi, 2019. "Governing urban water services in Europe: Towards sustainable synchronous regimes," Post-Print halshs-01985168, HAL.
    5. Touzard, Jean-Marc & Labarthe, Pierre, 2016. "Regulation Theory and Transformation of Agriculture: a Literature Review," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 20.
    6. Dervillé, Marie & Allaire, Gilles, 2014. "Change of competition regime and regional innovative capacities: Evidence from dairy restructuring in France," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P1), pages 347-360.
    7. Buchs, Arnaud, 2014. "Comprendre le changement institutionnel," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 16.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ressources communes; communs immatériels; marchés; institution; bien public; propriété intangible; recursos comunes; comunes inmateriales; mercados; instituciones; bien público; propiedad intangible; common pool resources; immaterial commons; markets; institutions; public good; intangible property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

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