IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/seh/wpaper/1307.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

El anidamiento institucional y su dinámica histórica en comunidades rurales complejas. Dos estudios de caso (Navarra, siglos XIV-XX)

Author

Listed:
  • Josemiguel Lana Berasain
  • Miguel Laborda Pemán

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of nested governance of common-pool resources from a long-term perspective. Our main research questions are: How was nesting articulated in pre-industrial societies? Which were their advantages and risks? Which are the factors that explain their origin and dynamics? To answer them, we analyse two historical case studies of nested regimens. In particular, the Valley of Roncal and the Sierra de Lokiz, both of them situated in Navarre, arranged across several levels the management and use of grazing pastures and forests by the 14th century.

Suggested Citation

  • Josemiguel Lana Berasain & Miguel Laborda Pemán, 2013. "El anidamiento institucional y su dinámica histórica en comunidades rurales complejas. Dos estudios de caso (Navarra, siglos XIV-XX)," Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria 1307, Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria.
    • Handle: RePEc:seh:wpaper:1307
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repositori.uji.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/75968/DT%20SEHA%2013-07.pdf?sequence=1
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "‘Whatever is, is right’? Economic institutions in pre‐industrial Europe," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(4), pages 649-684, November.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    3. Gibson, Clark C. & Ostrom, Elinor & Ahn, T. K., 2000. "The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 217-239, February.
    4. Ackerman, John, 2004. "Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 447-463, March.
    5. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
    6. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347.
    7. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    8. Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
    9. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    10. Elinor Ostrom, 2016. "Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions at Other Scales?," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Graciela Chichilnisky & Armon Rezai (ed.), The Economics of the Global Environment, pages 259-276, Springer.
    11. Tine De Moor, 2009. "Avoiding tragedies: a Flemish common and its commoners under the pressure of social and economic change during the eighteenth century1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(1), pages 1-22, February.
    12. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    2. Croutzet, Alexandre & Lasserre, Pierre, 2017. "Optimal completeness of property rights on renewable resources in the presence of market power," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 16-32.
    3. Calfucura, Enrique, 2018. "Governance, Land and Distribution: A Discussion on the Political Economy of Community-Based Conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 18-26.
    4. Liu, Jing & Qin, Tianbao, 2018. "A Comparative Analysis of Fishing Rights From a Transaction Cost Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 89-99.
    5. Caballero, Gonzalo, 2015. "Community-based forest management institutions in the Galician communal forests: A new institutional approach," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 347-356.
    6. Kashwan, Prakash & MacLean, Lauren M. & García-López, Gustavo A., 2019. "Rethinking power and institutions in the shadows of neoliberalism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 133-146.
    7. Rizwana Alam & Jon C. Lovett, 2019. "Prospects of Public Participation in the Planning and Management of Urban Green Spaces in Lahore: A Discourse Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-28, June.
    8. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, November.
    9. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. James Rising, 2014. "Creating the Commons: Fisheries and the World Bank," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(1), pages 75-95.
    11. Orsi, Fabienne, 2013. "Elinor Ostrom et les faisceaux de droits : l’ouverture d’un nouvel espace pour penser la propriété commune," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    12. McCloskey Deirdre Nansen, 2018. "The Two Movements in Economic Thought, 1700–2000: Empty Economic Boxes Revisited," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-20, December.
    13. Gani, Azmat & Scrimgeour, Frank, 2014. "Modeling governance and water pollution using the institutional ecological economic framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 363-372.
    14. Kanchanaroek, Yingluk & Termansen, Mette & Quinn, Claire, 2013. "Property rights regimes in complex fishery management systems: A choice experiment application," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 363-373.
    15. Allaire, Gilles, 2013. "Les communs comme infrastructure institutionnelle de l’économie marchande," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    16. Richter, Andries & Grasman, Johan, 2013. "The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 202-209.
    17. Lambini, Cosmas Kombat & Nguyen, Trung Thanh, 2014. "A comparative analysis of the effects of institutional property rights on forest livelihoods and forest conditions: Evidence from Ghana and Vietnam," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 178-190.
    18. Elinor Ostrom, 2014. "Do institutions for collective action evolve?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 3-30, April.
    19. Brett M. Frischmann & Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello, 2019. "Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 211-228, Fall.
    20. Bene, Christophe, 2003. "When Fishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First Step Beyond the Old Paradigm on Poverty in Small-Scale Fisheries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 949-975, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective action; nesting principle; commons; regulations; conflicts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:seh:wpaper:1307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Antonio Linares (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sehiaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.