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Analysis of employees’ perceptions of performance contracting in the ministry lands, Kenya

Author

Listed:
  • Chelang’a James KIPROP

    (Chelang’a James Kiprop, Moi University, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Edoret, Kenya)

  • Duncan Kiboyye OKOTH-YOGO

    (Duncan Kiboyye Okoth-Yogo, Moi University, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Eldoret, Kenya)

  • Kariuki G. CHARAGU

    (Kariuki G. Charagu, Civil Service, Kenya)

Abstract

Performance contract (PC) is a negotiated agreement, arrived at after a meeting of minds, between a government and a respective ministry, department, agency or a public officer, clearly specifying short-term implementation goals, obligations and responsibilities between the two parties (GOK, 2004a) . It is an integral part of both bureaucratic law and management renewal in the public services, useful in identifying priorities and required inputs, for improved service delivery. The study was an endeavor to establish the employees’ perception of the relevance of PC as a tool for improving service delivery, its impact in the ministry of lands and the challenges it encounters. It was guided by the agency theory. Data was collected from 91 respondents who were employees in the department of land adjudication and settlement at its Nairobi headquarters, 16 respondents from Thika and 13 from Machakos districts respectively. Secondary data was sourced from existing literature after which descriptive statistics was proffered. The study established that employees think positively of PC as useful in advancing effective governance but face the challenge of inadequate resources and lack of ownership. The study recommends changes in the fiscal allocation regulations by providing for increased budgetary provisions for PC implementation programs and increased rewards based on performance in order to improve both quantity and quality of output.

Suggested Citation

  • Chelang’a James KIPROP & Duncan Kiboyye OKOTH-YOGO & Kariuki G. CHARAGU, 2014. "Analysis of employees’ perceptions of performance contracting in the ministry lands, Kenya," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2014(22), pages 26-40, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rom:rampas:v:2014:y:2014:i:22:p:26-40
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mallon, Richard D., 1994. "State-owned enterprise reform through performance contracts: The Bolivian experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 925-934, June.
    2. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2010. "Fairness and desert in tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 346-364, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Performance Contracts; Agency Theory; Employee; Perceptions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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