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Remuneration to improve employee performance at waled regional hospital, Cirebon regency

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  • Ipik Permana

    (Universitas Swadaya Gunung Jati, Indonesia)

  • Haryo Bharoto

    (Universitas Swadaya Gunung Jati, Cirebon, Indonesia)

Abstract

Remuneration is a government policy that aims to improve employee welfare and improve employee performance. Through allowances in the form of remuneration, it is hoped that it can encourage more fun and can improve employee performance. However, even in agencies that already have remuneration, in reality, there are still dissatisfied employees. This study used a qualitative research design, with an inductive descriptive approach. The results of the study say that remuneration is closely related to performance, so the better the wage system, the better the employee's performance. However, it turns out that providing good remuneration does not necessarily result in good performance. Employee performance, in terms of service quality has been considered quite good, the speed, ability and initiative of employees are not considered maximal. Key Words:Remuneration, Employee Performance, Regional Hospital

Suggested Citation

  • Ipik Permana & Haryo Bharoto, 2021. "Remuneration to improve employee performance at waled regional hospital, Cirebon regency," International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 10(7), pages 163-169, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:rbs:ijbrss:v:10:y:2021:i:7:p:163-169
    DOI: 10.20525/ijrbs.v10i7.1455
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Main, Brian G M & Bruce, Alistair & Buck, Trevor, 1996. "Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1627-1644, November.
    2. Fanzheng Yang, 2016. "The Effects of Compensation Schemes and Performance Feedback on Employee’s Self-Selection: An Experimental Investigation," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 159-187, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    3. Tesfaye T. Lemma & Mthokozisi Mlilo & Tendai Gwatidzo, 2020. "Board remuneration, directors’ ownership and corporate performance: the South African evidence," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 491-511, July.
    4. Alcindo Mendes & Rogério João Lunkes & Leonardo Flach & Silvana Dalmutt Kruger, 2017. "The influence of remuneration on the behavior of hospital employees in Brazil," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 62(1), pages 207-221, Enero-Mar.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chieh-Yu Lin & Fu-Chiang Shih & Yi-Hui Ho, 2023. "Applying the Balanced Scorecard to Build Service Performance Measurements of Medical Institutions: An AHP-DEMATEL Approach," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(2), pages 1-17, January.

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