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Il B2B e il paradigma dei costi di transazione

Author

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  • Pierluigi Sabbatini

    (Autoritˆ Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roma)

Abstract

Business to Business (B2B) Internet commerce causes a significant contraction of transaction costs. According to the Coase paradigm, we would thus expect a deverticalization of the industry and broader scope for anonymous market mechanisms. In reality, such expectations are not fully borne out by the facts. When the industrial structure is concentrated the B2Bgenerally loses its independence, and is owned by the firms which most contribute to its development, e.g. the ones able to bring the liquidity to it. The B2B governance mechanism established by these firms gives hierarchical mechanisms a role which they do not usually play in extensive, anonymous markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierluigi Sabbatini, 2001. "Il B2B e il paradigma dei costi di transazione," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 54(214), pages 139-173.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2001:21
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/9773/9659
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost; Transaction Costs; Transactions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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