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Collaborative e-work parallelism in supply decisions networks: the chemical dimension

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel Scavarda

    (Purdue University)

  • Rodrigo Reyes Levalle

    (Purdue University)

  • Seokcheon Lee

    (Purdue University)

  • Shimon Y. Nof

    (Purdue University)

Abstract

In today’s increasingly networked and interconnected environments, business processes and associated decisions tend to span across organizational boundaries, making traditional centralized coordination impractical and/or unfeasible. Furthermore, collaborative networked organizations need to be able to respond to rapidly changing demands and requirements, under uncertain conditions and without centralized control. This situation emphasizes the need for adaptive, distributed, and self-coordinated supply network decisions models. This study focuses on the efficient coordination of parallel, reconfigurable, inter-organizational supply operations. The chemical dimension of collaborative e-work parallelism is introduced, including a novel market-based mechanism that supports supply networks’ parallel and decentralized reconfiguration. The newly developed approach is illustrated by examples from a global industry network, demonstrating its advantages, and identifying its limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Scavarda & Rodrigo Reyes Levalle & Seokcheon Lee & Shimon Y. Nof, 2017. "Collaborative e-work parallelism in supply decisions networks: the chemical dimension," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 28(6), pages 1337-1355, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joinma:v:28:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10845-015-1054-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10845-015-1054-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    2. Yoon, Sang Won & Nof, Shimon Y., 2011. "Affiliation/dissociation decision models in demand and capacity sharing collaborative network," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 135-143, April.
    3. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yilmaz, Ibrahim & Yoon, Sang Won, 2020. "Dynamic-distributed decisions and sharing protocol for fair resource sharing in collaborative network," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    2. Ardjmand, Ehsan & Sanei Bajgiran, Omid & Rahman, Shakil & Weckman, Gary R. & Young, William A., 2018. "A multi-objective model for order cartonization and fulfillment center assignment in the e-tail/retail industry," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 16-34.

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