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Coordination et incitations dans les contrats de recherche. Le cas des accords public / privé

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  • Pierre-Benoît Joly
  • Stéphane Lemarié
  • Vincent Mangematin

Abstract

[eng] Co-ordination and incentives in R&D contracts : the case of public/private agreements. . How can research activities between different independent actors be coordinated ? After having identified the limits of solutions provided by traditional theories (contracts theory and transaction costs theory), this text proposes an empirical and theoretical framework of analysis. In order to go beyond the static nature of these traditional theories, we consider the problem from the viewpoint of resource creation and see the initial contract as an intrinsically imperfect solution aimed at favouring cooperation. An analytical framework which emphasizes diffe­rent modes of coordination and their combinations is proposed. Empirical analysis allows us to identify different relationship logics which correspond to particular associations linking the research themes, technical devices and modes of organization adopted. [fre] Coordination et incitations dans les contrats de recherche. Le cas des accords public/privé. . Comment coordonner les activités de recherche dans les contrats public/privé ? Après avoir identifié les limites des réponses apportées dans le cadre des théories traditionnelles (théorie des contrats et théorie des coûts de transaction), ce texte propose un cadre d'analyse empirique et théorique. Afin de dépasser le caractère statique de ces théories traditionnelles, il convient de se situer dans une optique de création de ressources et de considérer le contrat initial comme une solution intrinsèquement imparfaite dont l'objectif est de favoriser l'apprentissage de la coopération. Un cadre analytique mettant l'accent sur les différentes modalités de coordination et sur leurs combinaisons est proposé. L'analyse empirique permet alors d'identifier différentes logiques de relation qui correspondent à des associations particulières liant les thématiques de recherche, les dispositifs techniques et les modes d'organisation adoptés.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Benoît Joly & Stéphane Lemarié & Vincent Mangematin, 1998. "Coordination et incitations dans les contrats de recherche. Le cas des accords public / privé," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(4), pages 1129-1149.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_4_410034
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1998.410034
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1998.410034
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