Coordinating Research Through Research Joint Ventures
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- Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993. "Coordinating research through research joint ventures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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research ; patents ; economic models;All these keywords.
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