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L'emprunt de la théorie économique à la tradition sociologique. Le cas du don contre-don

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  • Yves Zenou
  • Philippe Batifoulier
  • Laurent Cordonnier

Abstract

[eng] Use of economc theory in the sociological tradition : the case of gift exchange. . By tradition, the study of gift exchange belongs to the field of sociology. Some recent works have tried to make the connexion between economy and sociology by transposing the archaic exchange pattern (gift exchange) into our modem economic societies. The purpose of these attempts is to give some insights inlo some particular relationships, like for example, the work relationship. It appears that these insights are very limited and deceptive because of some strong hypothesis such as the perfect rationality of the agents. Nevertheless, their merits are to provide an hypothesis for the appearance of an non-intentional cooperation within an entirely non-cooperative system. Moreover, it seems that the introduction of non-utilitarist motivations in the theory of decision could help to understand the gift exchange relationship, which is a sort of compromise between moral action and interested action. [fre] L'emprunt de la théorie économique à la tradition sociologique. Le cas du don contre-don. . Le don contre-don est un objet d'étude qui appartient par tradition à la sociologie. Des travaux récents tentent de transposer les schémas de la réciprocité archaïque aux échanges qui ont cours dans la sphère économique des sociétés modernes. Le but de ces tentatives est de rendre compte de la forme atypique de certains échanges économiques, comme par exemple la relation de travail. Mais, à défaut de préciser davantage les hypothèses sur les comporte­ments des acteurs, ou en faisant reposer exclusivement le don contre-don sur la rationalité instrumentale, l'économie laisse évanouir ce nouvel objet. Le contraire exigerait, au minimum, la réintroduction de motivations non utilitaristes dans la théorie de la décision. Le don contre-don se situe en effet dans une sorte de compromis entre l'action morale et l'action intéressée.

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  • Yves Zenou & Philippe Batifoulier & Laurent Cordonnier, 1992. "L'emprunt de la théorie économique à la tradition sociologique. Le cas du don contre-don," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(5), pages 917-946.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1992_num_43_5_409404
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1992.409404
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1992.409404
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    Cited by:

    1. BEJEAN, Sophie & MIDY, Fabienne & PEYRON, Christine, 1999. "La rationalité simonienne : Interprétations et enjeux épistémologiques," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-14, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    2. Mario A. Cedrini & Roberto Marchionatti, 2017. "On the Theoretical and Practical Relevance of the Concept of Gift to the Development of a Non-imperialist Economics," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 633-649, December.
    3. Anna M. Carabelli & Mario A. Cedrini, 2010. "“Veiling The Controversies with Dubious Moral Attitudes”? Creditors and Debtors in Keynes’s Ethics of International Economic Relations," Working Papers 127, SEMEQ Department - Faculty of Economics - University of Eastern Piedmont.
    4. Godbout, Jacques T., 1998. "The moral of the gift," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 557-570.

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