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Institutions and Participants in Walras's Model of Oral Pledges Markets

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  • Donald A. Walker

Abstract

[eng] Institutions and participants in walrass model of pledges markets. . For many years the opinion has been expressed in the literature on Leon Walras's work that he did not pay attention to market institutions in his theory of exchange. It is shown that in fact he founded his model of a purely competitive organized oral pledges market upon a detailed specification of the institutions and other structural features that condition the traders' behavior, including raies, conventions, kinds of firms represented, and kinds of commodities and trades. It is shown that he also explained how the phenomena and processes of organized markets arise from economic needs and are related to other economic processes. He drew upon empirical information to construct his model, and illuminated that information with his theoretical perceptions. [fre] Institutions and Participants in Walras's Model of Oral Pledges Markets. . Pendant beaucoup d'années, l'opinion exprimée dans la littérature sur les œuvres de Léon Walras considérait qu'il a failli prendre en compte les institutions du marché dans sa théorie de l'échange. Cet article fait le constat inverse : Walras a fondé son modèle d'un marché concurrentiel avec engagements oraux sur une exposition minutieuse des institutions et des autres caractéristiques structurelles qui influencent la manière d'agir des échangeurs. Ces caractéristiques incluent les règles, les conventions, les types d'entreprises représentées, les denrées, ainsi que les différents échanges réalisés. On montre que Walras a par ailleurs expliqué que les phénomènes et les processus des marchés organisés sont créés par des besoins économiques et sont liés à la production et à l'épargne.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald A. Walker, 1990. "Institutions and Participants in Walras's Model of Oral Pledges Markets," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(4), pages 651-668.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1990_num_41_4_409229
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Walker, Donald A, 1987. "Walras's Theories of Tatonnement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 758-774, August.
    2. Smith, Vernon L, et al, 1982. "Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 58-77, March.
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    1. Richard Arena & Ludovic Ragni, 2019. "Nature humaine et choix rationnel : Pareto contre Walras ?," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-06, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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