IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/reveco/reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_1_408970.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Les fondements micro-économiques de la jurisprudence concurrentielle (française et européenne)

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Glais

Abstract

[eng] The microeconomic foundations of French and EEC antitrust cases. . Does the jurisprudence in matter of competition make sufficient use of the teachings of the specialists in theory of priee and industrial economies ?. This question is indeed of great interest as we know the determining part played by the specialists in Law in the commissions in charge of the competition policy. The expert's report which has been carried out from the study of French an European judicial precedents should reassure the economists.. By considering freedom of entry as the essential condition to ensure the smooth running of a market, by stressing on the distinction between Tacit Collusion and mere tactics of « conscious parallelism », the French and European commissions have shown that they had, explicitly or implicitly backed up their decisions with long-or mewlyconfirmed analysis. (The theory of contestable markets for instance.) However a few adjustements are still necessary : first where dominant position is concerned it would be advisable to give up systematical reference to the relevant market and to emphasize the notion of « obliged partner » (partenaire oblige). Besides, the analysis of the jurisprudence leads us to insist on the limits of a competition policy on some markets and on the necessity to make combined use of other weapons of the economie policy. [fre] Les fondements micro-économiques de la jurisprudence concurrentielle (française et européenne). . La jurisprudence concurrentielle s'appuie-t-elle, de façon suffisante, sur les enseignements des économistes spécialistes de la théorie des prix et de l'économie industrielle ?. Cette question n'est pas sans intérêt quand on sait le poids prépondérant des spécialistes du Droit au sein des commissions chargées de la police de la concurrence.. L'expertise menée dans cet article, à partir de l'analyse des jurisprudences française et européenne, est de nature à rassurer les économistes.. En faisant de la liberté d'entrée la condition indispensable au fonctionnement normal d'un marché, en s'attachant à séparer les situations d'ententes des simples tactiques de «parallélisme conscient», les autorités françaises et européennes ont fait la preuve qu'elles s'appuyaient, explicitement ou implicitement, sur des analyses théoriques, confirmées ou nouvelles (théorie des Marchés disputables par exemple).. Quelques réglages s'avèrent toutefois encore nécessaires. Tout d'abord en matière de position dominante grâce à une utilisation moins systématique de la notion de « Relevant Market » et à un appel plus fréquent au concept de « Partenaire obligé ».. L'analyse de la jurisprudence conduit ensuite à mettre en évidence les limites de l'emploi de la politique de concurrence sur certains marchés ainsi que la nécessité d'utiliser conjointement d'autres armes de la politique économique.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Glais, 1987. "Les fondements micro-économiques de la jurisprudence concurrentielle (française et européenne)," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 75-116.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_1_408970
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_1_408970
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Richard Schmalensee, 1978. "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 305-327, Autumn.
    3. Schmalensee, Richard, 1983. "Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An Exploratory Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 636-653, August.
    4. Demsetz, Harold, 1982. "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 47-57, March.
    5. Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(2), pages 132-132.
    6. Krattenmaker, Thomas G & Salop, Steven C, 1986. "Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 109-113, May.
    7. Alexander Henderson, 1954. "The Theory of Duopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 68(4), pages 565-584.
    8. Ayanian, Robert, 1983. "The Advertising Capital Controversy," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 349-364, July.
    9. Schmalensee, Richard, 1982. "Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 24-28, May.
    10. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lutz, Clemens & Kemp, Ron & Dijkstra, S. Gerhard, 2007. "SME's perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers," Research Report 07009, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    2. repec:dgr:rugsom:07009 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Jacques-François Thisse, 2000. "Microeconomic theories of imperfect competition," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 47-99.
    4. Clemens Lutz & Ron Kemp & S. Gerhard Dijkstra, 2010. "Perceptions regarding strategic and structural entry barriers," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 19-33, July.
    5. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    6. Michel Glais, 1996. "Les entreprises de grande taille face au droit communautaire de la concurrence Application au cas des multinationales de l'agro-alimentaire," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 231(1), pages 47-55.
    7. Brennan, Timothy J., 2000. "The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation," Discussion Papers 10716, Resources for the Future.
    8. Lalit Manral, 2015. "The demand-side dynamics of entrant heterogeneity," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 401-445, April.
    9. Hernán Herrera Echeverry, 2007. "Lanzamiento de nuevas marcas en industrias de productos homogéneos básicos con altos niveles de concentración," Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público 11812, Universidad EAFIT.
    10. Bronnenberg, Bart & Dube, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "The Formation of Consumer Brand Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 11648, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Margaret Aksoy-Pierson & Gad Allon & Awi Federgruen, 2013. "Price Competition Under Mixed Multinomial Logit Demand Functions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1817-1835, August.
    12. Wright, Melissa A. & Beatty, Timothy K.M. & Chouinard, Hayley H., 2020. "Do firms leverage the FDA nutrient label rounding rules to generate favorable nutrition fact panels or health claims?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    13. Kennedy, Robert E., 1997. "A tale of two economies: Economic restructuring in post-socialist Poland," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 841-865, June.
    14. Nicolaï Foss & Nils Stieglitz, 2012. "Modern Resource-based Theory(ies)," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 20, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Bernardo Batiz-Lazo & Douglas Wood, 2003. "Corporate strategy for Mexican banks and market contestability," Industrial Organization 0301014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Jing Li & Edward C. Jaenicke & Tobenna D. Anekwe & Alessandro Bonanno, 2018. "Demand for ready‐to‐eat cereals with household‐level censored purchase data and nutrition label information: A distance metric approach," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(4), pages 687-713, October.
    17. Church, J. & Gandal, N., 1993. "Equilibrium Foreclosure and Complementary Products," Papers 3-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    18. Rchard Schmalensee, 2004. "Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 471-475, May.
    19. Button, Kenneth & Frye, Hailey & Reaves, David, 2020. "Economic regulation and E-scooter networks in the USA," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    20. Park, Gunno & Kim, Marco JinHwan & Kang, Jina, 2015. "Competitive embeddedness: The impact of competitive relations among a firm's current alliance partners on its new alliance formations," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 196-208.
    21. Benson Tsz Kin Leung & Pinar Yildirim, 2020. "Competition, Politics, & Social Media," Papers 2012.03327, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_1_408970. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/reco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.