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Byrokratická bariéra kvality regulace
[Bureaucratic constraint of the quality of regulation]

Author

Listed:
  • Lenka Gregorová
  • Milan Žák

Abstract

The paper analyzes an important part of the institutional quality - regulation and studies relation between the regulatory environment and the bureaucratic barriers. The analysis is based on theoretical models of the comparative institutional economics. In the paper, we discuss possibilities of measurement and evaluation of regulation and bureaucracy. We compare the quality of regulatory environment in the EU-25 countries for which we construct specific index. Given principles of the good regulation we characterize basic determinants of the regulatory environment and we try to evaluate how these principles are fulfilled in countries of the EU-25. Additionally, we aim to evaluate the quality of bureaucracy. Finally, we study how the regulatory environment is related to the bureaucratic barriers.

Suggested Citation

  • Lenka Gregorová & Milan Žák, 2008. "Byrokratická bariéra kvality regulace [Bureaucratic constraint of the quality of regulation]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2008(2), pages 196-228.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2008:y:2008:i:2:id:637:p:196-228
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.637
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; bureaucracy; institutional quality; models of capitalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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