Performance Measurement and Its Link to Incentive System
[Měření výkonnosti a jeho propojení se systémem odměňování]
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DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.462
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Performance measurement; Incentives; Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; Motivation crowding out; Měření výkonnosti; Odměňování; Vnitřní a vnější motivace; Vytěsnění motivace;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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