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A value-based model of job performance

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  • Michael Roos
  • Jessica Reale
  • Frederik Banning

Abstract

This agent-based model contributes to a theory of corporate culture in which company performance and employees’ behaviour result from the interaction between financial incentives, motivational factors and endogenous social norms. Employees’ personal values are the main drivers of behaviour. They shape agents’ decisions about how much of their working time to devote to individual tasks, cooperative, and shirking activities. The model incorporates two aspects of the management style, analysed both in isolation and combination: (i) monitoring efforts affecting intrinsic motivation, i.e. the company is either trusting or controlling, and (ii) remuneration schemes affecting extrinsic motivation, i.e. individual or group rewards. The simulations show that financial incentives can (i) lead to inefficient levels of cooperation, and (ii) reinforce value-driven behaviours, amplified by emergent social norms. The company achieves the highest output with a flat wage and a trusting management. Employees that value self-direction highly are pivotal, since they are strongly (de-)motivated by the management style.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Roos & Jessica Reale & Frederik Banning, 2022. "A value-based model of job performance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-26, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0262430
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0262430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sunkee Lee & Phanish Puranam, 2017. "Incentive Redesign and Collaboration in Organizations: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(12), pages 2333-2352, December.
    2. Burks, Stephen & Carpenter, Jeffrey & Goette, Lorenz, 2009. "Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 458-469, June.
    3. Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen, 2012. "Social norms and economic incentives in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 173-185.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jessica Reale & Frederik Banning & Michael Roos, 2024. "Unemployment Benefits and Job Quality: Unveiling the Complexities of Labour Market Dynamics," Papers 2407.20306, arXiv.org.

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