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Self-enhancement in moral hypocrisy: Moral superiority and moral identity are about better appearances

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  • Mengchen Dong
  • Jan-Willem van Prooijen
  • Paul A M van Lange

Abstract

People often consider themselves as more moral than average others (i.e., moral superiority) and present themselves as more moral than they actually are (i.e., moral hypocrisy). We examined whether feelings of moral superiority—as a manifestation of self-enhancement motives—motivates people’s hypocritical behavior, that is, their discrepant moral performances in public versus private settings. In three studies (total N = 1,151), participants distributed two tasks (one favorable and one unfavorable) between themselves and an anonymous partner, with the option of using an ostensibly fair randomizer (e.g., a self-prepared coin). We found that when experiencing feelings of moral superiority (vs. non-superiority), people, especially those who highly identified with moral values (Studies 1 and 2), were less likely to directly give themselves the favorable task, but they were not less likely to cheat in private after using the randomizer (Studies 1 to 3). Both self-enhancement motives and moral identity have implications for hypocritical behavior, by motivating public moral appearances but not private moral integrity.

Suggested Citation

  • Mengchen Dong & Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Paul A M van Lange, 2019. "Self-enhancement in moral hypocrisy: Moral superiority and moral identity are about better appearances," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(7), pages 1-17, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0219382
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0219382
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Melissa Bateson & Daniel Nettle & Gilbert Roberts, 2006. "Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting," Natural Field Experiments 00214, The Field Experiments Website.
    3. repec:feb:natura:0059 is not listed on IDEAS
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