IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0099841.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Influences of Agents with a Self-Reputation Awareness Component in an Evolutionary Spatial IPD Game

Author

Listed:
  • Chung-Yuan Huang
  • Chun-Liang Lee

Abstract

Iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations–an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we present a novel learning agent model possessing self-reputation awareness. Agents in our proposed model are capable of evaluating self-behaviors based on a mix of public and private interest considerations, and of testing various solutions aimed at meeting social standards. Simulation results indicate multiple outcomes from the addition of a small percentage of self-reputation awareness agents: faster cooperation, faster movement toward stability in an agent society, a higher level of public interest in the agent society, the resolution of common conflicts between public and private interests, and a lower potential for rational individual behavior to transform into irrational group behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Chung-Yuan Huang & Chun-Liang Lee, 2014. "Influences of Agents with a Self-Reputation Awareness Component in an Evolutionary Spatial IPD Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(6), pages 1-12, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0099841
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099841
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0099841
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0099841&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0099841?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. E. Maskin, 2009. "Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, chapter 4, pages 79-84, Springer.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    3. Yongkui Liu & Xiaojie Chen & Lin Zhang & Long Wang & Matjaž Perc, 2012. "Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-8, February.
    4. Zhen Wang & Lin Wang & Zi-Yu Yin & Cheng-Yi Xia, 2012. "Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(7), pages 1-9, July.
    5. Chen, Shu-Heng & Yeh, Chia-Hsuan, 2001. "Evolving traders and the business school with genetic programming: A new architecture of the agent-based artificial stock market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 363-393, March.
    6. Adler, Emanuel, 1992. "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 101-145, January.
    7. McGillivray, Fiona & Smith, Alastair, 2000. "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 809-824, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hu, Menglong & Wang, Juan & Kong, Lingcong & An, Kang & Bi, Tao & Guo, Baohong & Dong, Enzeng, 2015. "Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 47-52.
    2. Quan, Ji & Zhou, Yawen & Wang, Xianjia & Yang, Jian-Bo, 2020. "Information fusion based on reputation and payoff promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 368(C).
    3. Wang, Xu-Wen & Nie, Sen & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Wang, Bing-Hong & Chen, Shi-Ming, 2017. "Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 465(C), pages 153-158.
    4. Alexandra Guisinger & Alastair Smith, 2002. "Honest Threats," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(2), pages 175-200, April.
    5. Gary Uzonyi & Matthew Wells, 2016. "Domestic institutions, leader tenure and the duration of civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(3), pages 294-310, July.
    6. Tatsuya Sasaki & Hitoshi Yamamoto & Isamu Okada & Satoshi Uchida, 2017. "The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
    7. Wang, Yi-Ling, 2013. "Asymmetric evaluation of fitness enhances spatial reciprocity in social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 76-81.
    8. Wang, Yi-Ling, 2013. "Learning ability driven by majority selection enhances spatial reciprocity in prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 96-100.
    9. Xia, Chengyi & Miao, Qin & Zhang, Juanjuan, 2013. "Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 22-30.
    10. Paulson Gjerde, Kathy A. & Slotnick, Susan A., 2004. "Quality and reputation: The effects of external and internal factors over time," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 1-20, May.
    11. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    13. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
    14. Cali Mortenson Ellis & Michael C. Horowitz & Allan C. Stam, 2015. "Introducing the LEAD Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 718-741, August.
    15. Anne Corcos & Yorgos Rizopoulos, 2011. "Is prosocial behavior egocentric? The “invisible hand” of emotions," Post-Print halshs-01968213, HAL.
    16. Germán Coloma, 2002. "Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 39(116), pages 123-133.
    17. Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 500-512.
    18. Alessio Emanuele BIONDO, 2011. "High-Tech Products and the Double Adverse Selection: Does Commercial Distribution Worsen Efficiency?," Journal of Knowledge Management, Economics and Information Technology, ScientificPapers.org, vol. 1(7), pages 1-18, December.
    19. Wang, Chengjiang & Wang, Li & Wang, Juan & Sun, Shiwen & Xia, Chengyi, 2017. "Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 293(C), pages 18-29.
    20. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0099841. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.