Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting
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- Agrawal, Ashwini, 2012. "Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: evidence from proxy voting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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