Undermining Governors: Argentina’s Double-Punishment Federal Spending Strategy
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- Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
- Ana L. De La O, 2013. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 1-14, January.
- Alejandro Bonvecchi & Germán Lodola, 2011. "The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(2), pages 179-206, Spring.
- Hicken, Allen & Kollman, Ken & Simmons, Joel W., 2016. "Party System Nationalization and the Provision of Public Health Services," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 573-594, September.
- McCarty, Nolan M., 2000. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 117-129, March.
- Kriner, Douglas L. & Reeves, Andrew, 2012. "The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 348-366, May.
- repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:73-105 is not listed on IDEAS
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