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Undermining Governors: Argentina’s Double-Punishment Federal Spending Strategy

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  • Tracy Beck Fenwick
  • Lucas González

Abstract

Throughout Latin American federations, programmatic welfare spending is increasingly nationally oriented and bureaucratically delivered. By explaining the logic and the effects of combining two types of federal spending, discretionary and non-discretionary, this article uncovers an additional driver that contributes to understanding policymaking and its implementation not only in Argentina, but potentially in other robust federal systems such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Using original data on federal infrastructure and programmatic social welfare spending for the twenty-four provinces of Argentina between 2003 and 2015, we provide empirical evidence that both forms of spending penalize opposition districts and more populated urban provinces (regardless of partisan affinity), and thus undercut the ability of key governors to become future presidential challengers. This research suggests that presidents of territorially diverse federations with strong governors can utilize the dual-punishment spending strategy to alter the balance of power, reinforcing the dominance of the center.

Suggested Citation

  • Tracy Beck Fenwick & Lucas González, 2021. "Undermining Governors: Argentina’s Double-Punishment Federal Spending Strategy," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 51(2), pages 283-306.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:51:y:2021:i:2:p:283-306.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjaa035
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