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Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market

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  • Ernesto Calvo
  • Maria Victoria Murillo

Abstract

Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork‐ridden political systems? This article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others. We explain such differences by focusing on political parties' access to resources (supply side) and voters' dependence on fiscal largesse (demand side). We show how these differences affect the patron's choice of public sector wages and employment. We use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in Argentina—Peronism and the UCR‐Alianza—and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:742-757
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 260-291, April.
    2. Albert Alesina & Stephan Danninger & Massimo Rostagno, 2001. "Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(3), pages 1-2.
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