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Improving refugee resettlement: insights from market design

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  • Justin Hadad
  • Alexander Teytelboym

Abstract

The current refugee resettlement system is inefficient because there are too few resettlement places and because refugees are resettled to locations where they might not thrive. We outline how ideas from market design can lead to better resettlement practices. In particular, we discuss how market design can incentivize participation of countries in resettlement and improve the matching of refugees at international and local levels; some of these insights have already put into practice. Finally, we highlight several further applications of market design in refugee resettlement, including cardinal preference submission and matching with transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Hadad & Alexander Teytelboym, 2022. "Improving refugee resettlement: insights from market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(3), pages 434-448.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:38:y:2022:i:3:p:434-448.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grac013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacob Nielsen Arendt & Christian Dustmann & Hyejin Ku, 2022. "Refugee migration and the labour market: lessons from 40 years of post-arrival policies in Denmark," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(3), pages 531-556.
    2. Jeremy Ferwerda & Nicholas Adams-Cohen & Kirk Bansak & Jennifer Fei & Duncan Lawrence & Jeremy M. Weinstein & Jens Hainmueller, 2020. "Leveraging the Power of Place: A Data-Driven Decision Helper to Improve the Location Decisions of Economic Immigrants," Papers 2007.13902, arXiv.org.
    3. Hillel Rapoport & Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2014. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a Policy Proposal to Reform the EU Asylum Policy," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/101, European University Institute.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 977, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    6. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202103100800001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    8. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tayfun Sonmez, 2023. "Minimalist Market Design: A Framework for Economists with Policy Aspirations," Papers 2401.00307, arXiv.org.

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