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Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance

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  • Guo Xu
  • Marianne Bertrand
  • Robin Burgess

Abstract

How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers. (JEL: J45, O43, D73, M5)

Suggested Citation

  • Guo Xu & Marianne Bertrand & Robin Burgess, 2023. "Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 371-419.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:39:y:2023:i:2:p:371-419.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewab022
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    1. Jonathan L. Weigel & Elie Kabue Ngindu, 2023. "The taxman cometh: Pathways out of a low‐capacity trap in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(360), pages 1362-1396, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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